How Japan lost the Battle of Midway, pt. 2

First Air Fleet, Transit to Midway, and Dangerous Signs

In part 1, we examined the background to Japan’s decision to bring battle to America at Midway, going all the way back to the Meiji Restoration.

In this part, we will look at the officers in command of the carrier force headed to Midway, Japanese intelligence efforts, and the final days leading to the first Japanese planes appearing over Midway.

First Air Fleet

On April 10th, 1941, Combined Fleet created something no one in the world had ever seen - a grouping of its carriers and core air power into a tactical unit. Possessing nearly 500 planes, it constituted the world’s greatest concentration of naval aviation power. This was a revolutionary thing, setting the stage for the use of carriers to travel long distances and bring tremendous power to bear at any desired point in the world.

The Japanese named this the First Air Fleet. Its tactical incarnation was known as the First Mobile Striking Force.

Or, if you prefer the Japanese name, Dai-ichi Kido Butai.

Kido Butai for short.

In any case, it is worthwhile to look at the men, officers, and ships of Kido Butai in the Battle of Midway.

They Shall Be My Finest Warriors Sailors

As mentioned in part 1, Japan had been caught in a very strong nationalistic and militaristic fervor in the years prior. This extended to the rank-and-file serving in the armed forces.

The first thing of note was the intense drive to succeed. To fail was to fail at one’s duty, and this had greater meaning to them as opposed to their Allied counterparts. An American sailor might keep his mouth shut about his ship’s details because that would lead to the enemy learning something valuable, a Japanese sailor would keep his mouth shut because it would be a stigma against literally everyone he ever knew.

The second thing was the incredibly harsh discipline. The official policy of drill instructors in the US has always been that touching a recruit is unacceptable because it allows for severe damage to be inflicted. In Japan, no sailor would be unfamiliar with men hit or even beaten for the most minor of infractions. Orders were to be followed instantly, and any refusal to conform meant a visit from officers who treated men like livestock.

But the crazy part was that insubordination was still well-known. It came primarily from junior officers, who were more than willing to use violence against their superiors. The ultra-right officers had even assassinated politicians who sought to control military activities and budgets.

The extent of this violence cannot be underestimated. In 1931, the Mukden Incident was the basis of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria. In 1937, the Kwantung Army essentially started the current conflict with China. In both cases, junior officers had been responsible, correctly intuiting in the latter case that their superiors would not order them back as that would imply they didn’t have control over the military.

This, the authors say, was the character of the navy - defined more by its extremes and contrasts than anything else. A place of extreme ferocity, extreme loyalty, and callous disregard for the lives within it. Technically and tactically astute, but lacking the “mental exertion needed to operate at the higher strategic levels required by a global war.”

(Mostly) Old Dogs

Chuichi Nagumo was the Vice Admiral in command of Kido Butai. 55 years old by then, he was a gruff man who had been at numerous commands in the oceans. He had a reputation for his intelligence, but this was due to his being a torpedo expert, not a carrier group commander. That said, hardly anyone was an expert in carrier warfare at this level, since the technology was very much new, the doctrines and tactics even newer.

His relationship with Yamamoto and the latter’s staff was dismal. Nagumo had very much opposed the Washington Naval Treaty and was even once a member of a group that threatened Yamamoto’s life directly. Indeed, he was not Yamamoto’s pick in the first place, but the original choice had been assigned elsewhere. Ultimately, Nagumo got the position on seniority, not merit.

If he had a fault that his peers knew of, it was that Nagumo was also given to delegating too much to younger officers. He cannot be totally faulted for this, given that he was commanding a force beyond his experience. Unfortunately for Japan, this also meant the odds of him adapting as needs fit were low or outright minuscule.

Nagumo’s right-hand man and First Air Fleet’s Chief of Staff was Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka. Like Nagumo, he had not started his career in aviation. Instead, he was originally a gunnery officer, though this changed when he was re-assigned in 1926 to an air group. Parshall and Tully describe him as a “man who recognized the potential of naval aviation and wanted to be associated with it, but whose training and personal insights into airpower were limited.” He was also passive and cautious like Nagumo, meaning there would be no bold actions likely coming from his mind.

Kido Butai’s other carrier admiral was Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi. In the words of fellow admiral Masataka Chihaya, he was “rough-hewn, [and] lacking precision of thought and a clear-cut sense of responsibility in the western sense of the word.” As the authors describe him, he was hot-tempered and aggressive, valuing honor over all else. In short, “the epitome of the traditional samurai.”

Minoru Genda was the first man you would find in Nagumo’s staff that was truly brilliant. He was a seasoned aviator and possessed a clear understanding of carrier warfare. Indeed, it was at his suggestion, along with another person, that Yamamoto had even agreed to create the First Air Fleet.

Kusaka would claim that Genda was arrogant in his abilities, and while this is possible, it is also the case that he knew his limitations. He was discomforted by the fact that no one could critique his plans, but no one else could even have come close to his knowledge on aerial matters in the first place.

New (War) Tricks

Of course, no description of Kido Butai would be complete without discussion of the carriers within it, especially since Midway is one of the great carrier battles. I would have written more about them, but I think it would not be as relevant, so a brief overview of the four going on this operation must do.

The first two aircraft carriers hailed from the First Carrier Division. These were the older Akagi and Kaga, the former being Nagumo’s flagship. These vessels were conversions, initially intended to be a cruiser and battleship respectively, but altered due to the Washington Naval Treaty’s limitations. It was aboard these two that Japanese naval aviation doctrine had been created, and even in 1942, Akagi was the most useful of the four going to Midway.

The second pair came from the Second Carrier Division. These were the newer Soryu and Hiryu, the latter of which was Yamaguchi’s flagship. Designed as carriers from the ground up, they were distinctly smaller and very lightly armored compared to Akagi and Kaga. However, they were incredibly fast, the fastest in the world when they launched.

Training in Transit

On May 27th, Kido Butai departed from Hashirajima and headed for Midway. On the way there, Nagumo ordered some training for his pilots.

It is said that his heart grew thrice as bitter that day, a feeling that would persist after the war. He found that in every relevant category (landings, dive-bombing, torpedo attacks, etc.), his pilots were far from the standards expected of Kido Butai.

He was not totally wrong. Kido Butai’s time at sea had meant a lack of formal training, especially for torpedo practice. You needed a major base and well-marked ranges for that. The places that the carriers had stopped for refueling had been just that, not the type of location that could accommodate training so many pilots. A few efforts had been made, but that was it.

However, there is no questioning that his pilots were still highly competent. Many of these men had been training for the Pearl Harbor attack, and a large group of these seniors were present in the ranks. They had also continued serving during the entire six month period between Pearl Harbor and Midway. These men lived and breathed carrier-based aircraft operations, not a damn one was lacking in that regard. Even the lack of weapons training was not a real problem, operations in the Indian Ocean had recently shown that the men were perfectly capable of executing dive-bombings of fast-moving warships.

Mechanical Misery

No, if there was a problem, it was in the number of planes available to him and their quality. These were military machines undergoing constant wear-and-tear, not to mention all the other issues technology is always prone to developing.

Why had this not been addressed? Because as modest as the demands on it had been thus far, Japanese industry couldn’t even handle these losses. Between major manufacturing companies Mitsubishi, Nakajima, and Aichi, only the first had a production line that ran well. The other two had neglected their own production in anticipation of newer aircraft.

In 1942, the US built 46,000 aircraft, with no category of plane having less than a thousand built save for very heavy bombers.

The Japanese built 56 carrier-based aircraft.

If Kido Butai and its armament were the weapon to cut down the US Pacific Fleet, then the blade aimed at America in June 1942 was showing clear signs of rust, with each of the four carriers having 16% fewer planes. Nagumo had a few extra fighters intended to garrison Midway, but his overall strength was only 248 planes. When compared to the 412 used in Pearl Harbor, the man was trying to win the battle with only 60% of forces he could have reasonably included in his count by early May.

But again, there was no cause for concern amongst the lower or upper ranks. The pilots planned on playing the same game as always - use better planes to down enemy pilots in scores or to send Western ships to their graves.

Trust But Verify

Yamamoto and Combined Fleet had always known that Pearl Harbor was where the US Navy’s Pacific Fleet was anchored, and that included its heaviest units, the carriers and battleships. But obviously, there was no guarantee they would be there during the operation. After all, the Americans could order their vessels on an operation of their own.

Thus, it was necessary to ensure the vessels were actually at Pearl Harbor before the operation, since this was all a waste of time otherwise. Assuming they were, the Japanese would then need adequate warning of when those vessels were leaving and on what route.

To accomplish this, the Japanese had two planned actions.

The first was to have a seaplane scout Pearl Harbor on May 31st. Since there was no Japanese base in range, the plan was to have a refueling submarine meet the seaplane on the French Frigate Shoals.

However, when the submarine arrived, it was shocked to see an American seaplane tender and destroyer escort in the area. Even after waiting a day, they hadn’t left. The operation was called off, meaning a vital question would be left unanswered.

The second was to have a submarine cordon that would warn of any north-bound American forces. Yamamoto and Nagumo received no reports from the subs. As such, they were confident no forces were yet moving from Pearl Harbor northward.

Ill Omens

An American submarine detected making an urgent communication ahead of Admiral Tanaka’s invasion force heading directly towards Midway.

More American submarines in the mid-Pacific and Aleutians.

Increased radio traffic marked “urgent” from Hawaii.

The storm of construction activity on Midway, along with aggressively patrolling planes taking off each day to look far into the ocean.

These were the signs that Japanese intelligence was receiving. Each piece of evidence gave further strength to the notion that the Americans were aware of what was about to happen and had their forces at sea, not at Pearl Harbor. Nagumo was certainly aware of this, having several important pieces if not everything.

What conclusions should he have derived from this?

1. American patrollers from Midway were operating far from the island, making detection much more likely.

2. Tanaka’s invasion force was in danger since Kido Butai was one day out of position (remember, it left a day late due to preparation issues).

3. The American fleet carriers were likely not at Pearl Harbor, but at sea.

With the failure to scout Pearl Harbor, this meant Nagumo was completely in the dark. American forces could literally be anywhere and he wouldn’t necessarily know. Planning for the worst was the prudent choice.

So why didn’t he? A few reasons come to mind.

The first was the general contempt towards American forces. Japan, despite the casualties in at Coral Sea, was coming off an unbroken chain of victories in the last six months. No matter their condition, the men and officers were convinced they could always handle the Americans. Nagumo, however, was not a man that appeared reckless or given to underestimating the enemy.

Here, Yamamoto and Nagumo’s relationship matters. The former had been unwilling to change any of the details of the operation, and Nagumo may have deemed it best to avoid getting castigated for deviation from the plan unless the situation urgently called for it.

The last reason extends to the Japanese military as a whole. It was, for the soldiers and sailors of the Empire of the Rising Sun, better to obey and die than have to think, an ability the navy and army had spent years beating out of them.

Plodding through Fog

By June 2nd’s morning, five days since Kido Butai had left, the weather grew much worse. A dense fog set in, making tactical movement much harder. Military vessels did not travel in a straight line, that was asking for a submarine to simply wait for the right moment to deliver a torpedo-shaped present. Keeping one’s station in fog with the zig-zagging maneuvers was a nightmare, you could never be really confident that you weren’t about to collide with a friendly.

Kido Butai had been operating on radio silence to avoid detection the whole time, and only Nagumo had the right to violate it. He eventually did so to tell all ships to turn at a certain point towards Midway. He could only hope the transmission had not been noticed.

To the south, Tanaka had a much worse time of it. The Americans had found him. In the morning, they were spotted by an American PBY Catalina. But it wasn’t until the late afternoon when bombs appeared around the fleet, dropped from high above. No hits were scored, and Tanaka radioed this to Combined Fleet.

Round 2, however, took place at night. After midnight, a trio of Catalinas attempted a torpedo run. A single one struck the oiler Akebono Maru, putting 23 men out of commission. It would, however, rejoin the fleet and continue.

The Americans had drawn first blood, but it did not matter. Kido Butai was in place, and the first strikes would take place shortly. Midway would fall, the enemy carriers and battleships would burn, and the US would have no more ability to interfere in the Pacific.

Next time: the Battle of Midway begins

Image Sources

Nagumo - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ch%C5%ABichi_Nagumo#/media/File:Chuichi_Nagumo.jpg

Kusaka - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ry%C5%ABnosuke_Kusaka#/media/File:RyunosukeKusaka.jpg

Yamaguchi - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:TamonYamaguchi.jpg

Genda - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minoru_Genda#/media/File:Minoru_Genda.jpg